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1 Annual Address by Bob Wessels
Bob Wessels opened the fourth annual conference of the Netherlands Association of
Comparative and International Insolvency Law (NACIIL) with an annual address, which
related to the themes that were to be discussed during this conference, such as the legal
protection of third parties and counterparties under the Single Resolution Mechanism
(SRM).More generally, his contribution focused on the recognition and of foreign recovery
and resolution measures and on the harmonisation of rules regarding this subject, which
has been terra incognita for a long time.
In October 2011, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) published its Key Attributes of
Effective ResolutionRegimes for Financial Institutions (KeyAttributes), which have become
to be regarded as the umbrella standard for resolution regimes covering financial institutions
of all types that could be systemic in failure and which set out the core elements for an
effective resolution regime. Three years later, the FSB adopted additional Key Attributes
specifically relating, inter alia, to information sharing for resolution purposes and the
protection of key client assets in resolution. However, the FSB still struggles with how to
implement a regime for giving legal effect to resolution measures beyond the territory in
which they have been taken and regards this as one of the main obstacles to the resolution
of cross-border operating systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs).
In September 2014, the FSB published a Consultative Document (the Document)
comprising a two-part package of policy measures and guidance, containing (1) statutory
changes that jurisdictions should consider adopting in order to enhance the effectiveness
of a cross-border resolution; and (2) contractual approaches that global SIFIs should
implement to achieve the same purpose pending widespread adoption of comprehensive
statutory changes. This Document also states that statutory frameworks are to be preferred
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as a longer-term solution, but acknowledges that very few jurisdictions have such frame-
works in place and that it will take time to implement these. Therefore, the FSB, for the
shorter term, proposes contractual solutions for two substantive areas perceived to be
critical to achieving orderly cross-border resolution, namely, (1) contractual arrangements
that will provide for the recognition of temporary restrictions or stays on early termination
rights in financial contracts; and (2) contractual recognition of the possible bail-in of debt
instruments in resolution where the relevant instruments are governed by the laws of a
jurisdiction other than that of issuing entity. With regard to the former, 18 SIFIs agreed
last week to delay by 24 hours their right to exercise certain early termination and cross-
default rights against one another in connectionwith certain over-the-counter transactions
when their counterparty is in imminent collapse and their fate is in the hands of the national
regulator.
But these contractual solutions are not to be seen as a substitute for statutory regimes,
and for that reason the Document also contemplates two statutory approaches for giving
effect to foreign resolution measures in a manner consistent with the earlier-mentioned
KeyAttributes, namely (1) recognition of a foreign proceeding; and (2) support for a foreign
proceeding in the context of a domestic proceeding. Although Wessels considered these
approaches to be welcome, he argued that the recognition-based framework should not
be left to the discretion of each individual jurisdiction. His proposal is that a text very
similar to the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-border Insolvency will be incorporated
into a EU Regulation. This could provide “a staged system of recognition of resolution
measures similar as provided to such judgements opening insolvency proceeding inwhich
the courts can investigate whether the interests of all parties concerned are adequately
protected”.
He further suggested an European Union (EU)-wide uniform approach to recognition
of resolution measures initiated outside the EU as this will be “coherent with the way the
EU has crafted its framework for bank resolution and recovery, it will enhance the proper
functioning of the internalmarket and it will support a unified external trade policy”. Such
a Model Law for financial institutions will be complementary to the current regime com-
prising the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD). The text of such a Model
Law must be aligned with the specifics of financial institutions as, for example, prompt
action is required to avoid a bank run.
He concluded that “in the area of our association interests, there are quite some chal-
lenges ahead”, but as NACIIL is in the forefront of these legal developments, it will seize
all the opportunities resulting from the challenges with the aim of further enriching its
members.
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2 Saskia Nuijten
Matthias Haentjens, the chair of the proceedings, then continued to introduce Saskia
Nuijten as the first speaker to make a presentation. This presentation concerned the legal
protection against actions and decisions of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) under the
SRM. The latter mechanism aims to ensure that if a bank would face serious difficulties
despite stronger supervision, its resolution could be managed efficiently with a minimum
of costs for taxpayers and the real economy. Nuijten started her presentation with an
explanation of the failure-preventing measures taken at the national and European level.
She considered five different measures, namely (1) bank rescues; (2) analysis, in particular
the comprehensive assessment of 130 banks by the European Central Bank (ECB); (3) the
single rule book; (4) the introduction of the Single Supervisory System (SSM); and (5) the
introduction of the SRM. All these failure-preventing measures might have the effect that
the considerations of Nuijten on legal protection will never be tested, but she, nevertheless,
discussed the main issues regarding legal protection in a phase-by-phase manner.
In Phase 0, the emphasis lies on the drawing up of a resolution plan of a bank by the
national resolution authority. In this phase, the SRB has no instruments that can be used
against banks. In actual practice, the bank will be required to assist in the drawing up of a
resolution plan on the basis of national legislation. Therefore, the national legal protection
regime will apply. For example, the Dutch Central Bank (DNB) will probably use its
authority to request information when fulfilling its obligation to draw up a resolution plan.
On a national level, there is little protection from such a request because under Dutch law
the administrative court will not provide such protection, and the civil court would only
perform a very limited review. If the SRB, after an analysis of the resolution plan, determines
that there are substantive impediments to the resolvability of the financial entity or
financial group, it will prepare a report, which is not a decision, and submit it to the entity
or group. The latter must then propose possible measures to address or remove the
impediments. If these measures are not effective or not existent, the SRB issues a decision,
by way of an instruction, to the national resolution authority, which has to use its own
powers to require the group or entity to address or remove the impediments. The latter
decision is pursuant Art. 85(3) of the SRM Regulation (SRMR) open for appeal to the
Appeal Panel, but only the national resolution authority can appeal as the decision is
addressed to this authority. One could argue that the original report has legal effect because
it results in the obligation to propose measures to a bank and, furthermore, one could
argue that the latter decision is of concern to the involved group or entity itself, but in both
instances there is no legal protection for these actors. As the legal effect only materialises
after the DNB follows the instructions of the SRB and takes action, only national legal
protection is available in this phase.
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In the next phase, Phase 1, the ECB might conclude that a bank is likely to fail when it
is not performing well. This determination is an important decision, but under the SRM
it does not have any other legal consequences than going to the third phase. Therefore,
this decision is not open for appeal. However, when the ECB, or SRB, decide(s) the bank
is not failing or likely to fail, the resolution powers and authorities do not become available,
and one could argue that this is a legal effect. This is the case under Dutch administrative
law.When the situation is less serious, the ECB can take early interventionmeasures. These
measures entail, inter alia, imposing higher capital requirements or the removal ofmembers
of themanagement body. The ECBhas to notify the SRB if any of thesemeasures are taken.
The SRB has, subsequently, the power to require the group or entity to contract potential
purchasers in order to prepare for the resolution of the group or entity. This seems to be
a requirement with legal effect, but the decision is not mentioned as a decision open for
appeal.
In the following phases, there are several consecutive decisions ultimately leading to
the adoption of the resolution scheme. First, if a bank is likely to fail, and the SRB deter-
mines, in the second phase, that there are no prospects for alternative private sector solu-
tions and resolution action is in the public interest, the SRB adopts a resolution plan. These
decisions are not open for appeal. Hereafter, the European Commission has to endorse or
object to the resolution scheme within 24 hours. The Council can also, within 12 hours,
approve or object to a material modification of the amount of Fund provided for the reso-
lution. Both decisions of the European institutions are not open for appeal. This results
in uncertainties because this, for example, might be different when the Commission does
not endorse or object to the scheme in time. In the fourth phase, the SRB will, within 8
hours, modify the adopted resolution scheme in accordance with the objections of the
European Commission or in accordance with the approved material modifications of the
amount of the Resolution Fund provided. Here again, there is uncertainty whether one is
legally protected against these modifications.
In the fifth phase, the resolution scheme enters into force after its endorsement by the
Commission and approval of theCouncil. Themeasures described in the resolution scheme
can be applied by the national resolution authority, but only after a valuation of the assets
and liabilities of an entity or group. This valuation, however, is an integral part of the
decision on the application of a resolution tool, and therefore there is no legal protection
concerning this valuation per se.
In the sixth and last phase, the resolution scheme is addressed to the national resolution
authority, and this authority has to implement this scheme by using its own resolution
powers. Therefore, national legal protection is available for the involved banks or other
involved persons. The national resolution authority, however, may use as a defence that
it is obliged to follow the instructions from the SRB. Therefore, the national courts can
and often must in this procedure request a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice
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on the decision of the SRB to adopt the resolution scheme. The SRB also monitors the
execution of the scheme and may give instructions to the national authorities. These
instructions, however, will not have legal effect until they are implemented by the national
authorities. Then again, national legal protection is available. Here again, the instruction
of the SRB can be judged by the national court by requesting a preliminary ruling from
the Court of Justice. Furthermore, if the national authority does not comply with the
instructions from the SRB, the SRB may issue executive orders to the involved bank. These
orders have legal consequences and are, therefore, open for appeal to the Appeal Panel.
During all these phases, the SRB can use supervisory and enforcement powers. For instance,
it can decide to conduct a general investigation. The decisions to investigative powers are
not directly open for appeal, but it is likely that an appeal to the Court of Justice is possible
because of the obligation to comply with these decisions. If a bank or involved person does
not comply, the SRB may impose a fine or a periodic penalty payment and, in the opinion
of Nuijten, these sanctions are quite convincing. For example, the basic amount of a fine
for non-compliancewith a general investigation can have amaximumof 0.15% of the total
annual net turnover.
Nuijten concluded that there is very little protection against actions from the SRB
because most of these actions will result in decisions of DNB, and these decisions are open
for legal protection accordingDutch national rules. The decisions of the SRB can be judged
in these procedures by preliminary rulings from the Court of Justice. The consequence is
that many important decisions cannot be contested in an early phase. Furthermore, it is
likely that these early decisions have contractual consequences before the national resolution
can take actions. The question will be whether the available legal protection will come in
time or only after passing a real point of no return.
3 Raluca Painter
The second presentation by Raluca Painter concerned the European Framework for Bank
Recovery and Resolution. Her presentation consisted of two parts. The first part related
to the BRRD, its main features and novelties and the second part to some difficult points
that the EC has encountered during the negotiations, while highlighting the divergent
opinions at times between the co-legislators or between the original proposal and the
position of the co-legislators.
The BRRDhas the objectives of (1)maintaining financial stability; (2)minimising costs
for taxpayers in case banks are failing; and (3) avoiding disorderly insolvency. In order to
achieve these objectives, the BRRD provides supervisors and resolution authorities with
a set of powers to strengthen their grasp of the structure of all banks as well as an ability
to plan and respond to the failure of the banks. Furthermore, the authorities will be granted
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powers to return a bank in financial distress back to viability or to resolve a non-viable
bank in the public interest. Under the BRRD, every Member State is obliged to put in place
a national resolution authority. Some Member States decided to create completely new
authorities, whereas other ones have decided to create special departments within supervi-
sors to deal with resolution matters. The only condition for such organisational structure
is that within the supervisory authority, the supervisory and resolution functions are sep-
arated in order to ensure that decisions are taken by the resolution authorities with signif-
icant objectivity compared to the decisions taken by supervisors.
The BRRD is the outcome of negotiations that took about 19 months, and during these
negotiations delicate balances had to be struck on, for instance, the treatment of home and
host authorities when agreeing actions on planning, prevention and resolution of cross-
border banks and on the parameters of a credible and usable bail-in tool. The result was
a comprehensive and flexible framework that consists of four pillars, namely (1) planning
and prevention; (2) early intervention; (3) resolution; and (4) cooperation and coordination.
Flexibility is preserved as the national resolution authorities are able to use a range of tools
and powers in a proportionate manner based on an institution’s business model, risk and
size and different types of crises. Because it is a directive that is to be transposed by the
Member States into their national laws, these Member States are also given sufficient
flexibility in order to implement the different provisions that are set up in the Directive.
Painter focused extensively on the bail-in mechanism that builds upon the idea that
from now banks would be saved not by public money, but by asking shareholders and
creditors to contribute to the loss that has occurred. She also addressed the different bail-
in mechanism thresholds. Once a bank is put into resolution, there has to be an 8% bail-
in of the total liabilities. If other resources are necessary, the resolution financing
arrangement may provide a capital injection of up to 5% of total liabilities. When these
funds do not provide to be sufficient, the BRRD allows, in case of a systemic crisis, for the
use of state stabilisation tools, although the EC will have to approve this use.
Painter also dealt with the cross-border cooperation within the EU and with third
countries in her presentation.With regard to the former, resolution colleges are established
that are to facilitate cooperation and coordination among authorities for the resolution of
cross-border banks. These authorities must come to joint decisions, and the European
Banking Authority (EBA) is given mediation powers in this respect. The BRRD also pre-
scribes some detailed principles on cross-border resolution within the EU, namely that,
inter alia, the resolution process should be transparent and efficient, and timely action has
to be taken. With regard to the cross-border cooperation with third countries, the Com-
mission is authorised to negotiate binding agreements with third countries on the basis
of a framework developed by the EBA, but before this is done the Member States may
enter into bilateral arrangements.
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After elaboration on the four pillars of the BRD, the focus of her presentation shifted
to the SRM.Under this system, there is a division of tasks between the SRB and the national
resolution authorities, but the SRB will ultimately be responsible for all banks and for the
use of the Single Resolution Fund (SRF). In the remainder of her presentation, Painter
focused on two important issues onwhich the co-legislators had divergent opinions, namely
the tasks of the plenary and executive sessions within the SRB and (the contributions to)
the SRF.
With regard to the former, the EC proposed a system whereby the executive session
would take all the individual resolution decisions by a simple majority rule. However, the
European Parliament (EP) and the Council had divergent views on how these decisions
should be taken. The outcome of their lengthy negotiations was the following. As a rule,
the Executive Board decides in specific resolution cases, but the Plenary Board decides
whether (1) a specific case requires more than five billion euros from the SRF; and (2)
whether the net accumulated use of the Fund in the prior consecutive 12 months reaches
five billion euros. In both latter cases, the decision should be taken by simple majority
representing at least 30% of the contributions.
The last issue discussedwas the SRF. This single fund, sourced from the banking sector,
is thought to create economies of scale, to boost credibility and to be instrumental in
breaking the link between bank debt and sovereign debt. The Commission originally
proposed a single fund fully mutualised as of day 1, and it would be built up during a 10-
year period. Here again, the EP and the Council had divergent opinions. The outcome of
these negotiations was that, during a transitional period of 8 years, the Fund comprises
national compartments corresponding to each participating Member State in the SRM,
and these Member States agreed upon an intergovernmental agreement on the transfer
and mutualisation of the contributions. The individual contributions of the banks are
calculated at the European level but are collected at national level pursuant to the afore-
mentioned intergovernmental agreement.
4 Discussion
After these presentations, the chair opened the floor for interventions from the audience.
The discussion was opened by Boudewijn Berger, who reacted on the presentation of
Raluca Painter. He asked her whether the Member States that are part of the Euro Area
still have the discretion to use stabilisation tools, because these tools are not mentioned in
the SRM.The reaction of Painter was short and clear: These government stabilisation tools
are not applicable in the Banking Union. This was the outcome of the negotiations con-
cerning the SRM.
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Rolef de Weijs continued with another question for Painter concerning the effects of
the exclusion of depositors from the bail-in tool and the preferred status of these depositors,
which he considered as being a novelty of the BRRD next to the introduction of the bail-
in tool. He wondered whether this whole plan would not backfire to the deposit holders.
These deposit holders will be receiving less interest even to such extent that the interest
will be negative. He referred to the situation in Germany at that time. Painter answered
that this question is quite difficult to answer, but as choices have to be made, the protection
of depositors was placed on the forefront. Besides that, Painter was doubtful that the current
situation is so negative as De Weijs seems to experience it. Boudewijn Berger added that
the current negative interest hasmore to dowith the overall low-yield/interest environment
and that the negative interest rate is not related to the higher protection of depositors.
Thomas van Rijn reacted to the presentation of Saskia Nuijten, and he wondered
whether her conclusion was justified. The focus of Nuijten’s presentation was, in his
opinion, on the formal criteria with regard to legal protection either on the European or
national level. VanRijn agreed that from a formal perspective, theremight be some lacunae,
but he wondered whether those could not be overcome by focusing on more substantial
criteria. He exemplified this by stating that in case the SRB gives very clear instructions to
a national resolution authority, this national authority cannot do anything else than to
follow these instructions. In such a case, it would be logical that there would be legal pro-
tection against the decision of the SRB before the Court of Justice. In his opinion, case law
of the Court of Justice offers all kind of examples in which the Court of Justice applies such
a material or substantial approach to legal protection, because one of the main concerns
of this Court of Justice is that there is always effective legal protection.
Nuijten agreed with van Rijn that she focused on the formal criteria and that there
might be another way of looking at it, but her main point was that the legal protection
under the SRM is currently uncertain as it does not explicitly state which lawyer you should
have to address. Moreover, the instructions of the SRB regarding the implementation of
its decisions are not binding. Therefore, the regulation directs to the national courts, but
it would be better, in her opinion, to have legal protection at the European level. She then
reiterated that her main issue is that it should be clear at what level the legal protection
will be, and this should not be dependent on case law.
Van Rijn disagreed and argued that the regulation provides the legal protection where
the formal decisions are taken. He then made a last remark with regard to the legal basis
of the SRF. In her paper, Nuijten stated that the SRF could not be based on Article 114
TFEU and that for that reason, an additional legal basis was chosen in the form of an
intergovernmental agreement. But in his opinion, the intergovernmental agreement was
the result of a political compromise to put the legal basis of the SRF outside of the treaties,
but not because Article 114 TFEU could not be the basis for the SRF. Painter agreed with
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this statement because she also saw the intergovernmental agreement as an outcome of
the negotiations concerning the SRM.
5 Bart Joosen
After the break, Matthias Haentjens introduced the third presenter, Bart Joosen, and said
that his contribution would focus on the bail-in mechanisms in the BRRD, a mechanism
that is considered bymany to be themost controversial topic of the directive. Joosen started
his presentation with the consideration that the last few years many new legal regimes
have been introduced all over the world, based on the global standards of the Basel Com-
mittee and the Financial Stability Board. Joosen mentioned that at this moment, the Basel
III standards are applied in almost all countries. He fully agreed with the introductory
remark of professor Bob Wessels that one would hope that we would be able to create
harmonised rules as regards the recognition of recovery and resolution measures.
According to Joosen, it is a lost opportunity that the European legislator was not able to
put the BRRD in the formof a regulation. Joosenwarned that thismay result in a patchwork
of national laws addressing the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment
firms, whereas many banking groups operate cross border. The recovery and resolution
of those internationally organised and operating institutionsmay again depend on different
national regimes.
TheBRRDcloses one gap thatwas left by theEuropeanCapital RequirementsRegulation
(CRR) in 2013. It establishes a contingent capital mechanism as regards Tier 2 capital
instruments. Yet some of the BRRD provisions are duplicative as compared to the existing
CRR regime. According to Joosen, the provisions already dealt with in the CRR should
not be included in the BRRD because this may give rise to conflicting rules and confusion.
Based on the Basel III regime, the CRR requires that contingent capitalmechanisms should
be incorporated in the terms and conditions for Additional Tier 1 capital instruments.
Consequently, when a so-called “trigger event” occurs, the debt obligations are either
converted in equity capital or wholly or partly written off. The BRRD also introduces a
write-down and conversion regime, that is, the bail-in tool, which can be applied as regards
a wide range of debt obligations, except for a list of liabilities that are excluded from the
scope of the tool.
The last few years’ contingent capital instruments have been issued bymany institutions
with great success, as the results of the Asset Quality Review of the European Central Bank
recently showed. Credit institutions even introduced Tier 2 capital instruments containing
contingent capital features with a high trigger, although this was not required in the CRR.
The issued instruments will be converted into equity capital when the capital ratio of the
institution drops, for instance, below 7%. According to Joosen, these mechanisms are
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particularly applied in circumstances where the operations of the institution are still going
concern. Therefore, these mechanisms may enable that we will never end up in the resolu-
tion regime of the BRRD. Joosen concluded that this shows that the market is wiser than
the regulator.
In many studies and reports, the bail-in tool has been placed in the context of a penal-
isation andpunishment of creditors and shareholders, who should paymuchmore attention
to the well-being and management of the institution beforehand. However, according to
Joosen, creditors and shareholders are restricted in their rights as a result of the capital
requirements and the prudential supervision imposed on institutions. Creditors and
shareholders can therefore hardly contribute to the management of the institution.
Finally, the BRRD works on the hypothesis that the bail-in tool can be enforced by
means of a statutory basis. Only with regard to the contractual relationships that are gov-
erned by the law of a third country, contractual provisions about the enforceability of the
measures in the third country are required. Joosen recommended that this contractual
addition should always be put in the various contracts governing bail-in-able debt, as an
extra contractual emphasis on the restriction of rights of creditors once the bail-in
mechanism is being applied.
6 Patrick Clancy
Patrick Clancy started his presentation by mentioning that he wanted to look to bank
recovery and resolution “… from the other side of the telescope.” He highlighted the
consequences of the resolution measures for the position of counterparties, especially in
repos and derivatives contracts. Before the financial crisis, which Clancy referred to as
“the regulatory revolution”, many counterparties traded in derivatives without security
from the institution, while big positions and exposures were built up. Where collateral
arrangements were in place, in particular for derivatives, very high initial thresholds were
often used. This resulted in a so-called “credit cliff’. Since the financial crisis, a lot has
changed in financial regulation. There are now, for instance, more capital requirements
and rules as regards recovery and resolution planning and as regards clearing.
Clancy argued that the resolution measures will not, per se, improve the behaviour of
institutions, unless you provide some information to the shareholders and the potentially
bail-in-able creditors that allows them to assess what the financial situation of the institution
is. This is, however, not required by the BRRD.
The BRRD provides for four resolution tools: the sale of business, the transfer to a
bridge institution, the transfer to an asset management entity and the bail-in tool. The
bail-in tool is, however, only available where the business is to be continued. In some cases,
the business has to be wound up under normal insolvency law. Where the resolution tools
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are applied, counterparties may suddenly face a replacement or a substitute institution or
may find their contract suddenly terminated. Yet these measures are not provided for in
the contractual documentation and do not provide protection for their wishes, credit lines
and rating requirements. Moreover, the bail-in tool can result in the write-down of liabil-
ities of the institution or the conversion of the creditor’s claim into equity. Secured liabilities
are exempted from bail-in, including all repos and collateralised derivatives, but only to
the extent of the coverage. Clancy argued that there is, therefore, absolutely no reason for
a counterparty anymore to deal with an institution on a non-collateralised basis.
When a derivative position is terminated by the resolution authority and the liability
resulted from the termination is bailed in, it is not clear how the value of the position is
to be determined. According to Clancy, special rules need to be developed for the valuation
of derivatives. Under the BRRD, the EBA has to develop regulatory technical standards
specifying the methodologies and the processes for the valuation exercise and has a wide
discretion to do this. Clancy was worried about how the methodologies and the timetable
for the valuation will look like. Moreover, Clancy was not sure that the bail-in tool “… is
the end of our story”. In case the bail-in tool is applied, the resolution authorities will
determine how much need to be bailed in to restore the required Common Equity Tier 1
capital ratio of the institution. There is, however, no BRRD mechanism that requires the
use of any further liabilities of the institution in order to create an increased quantity of
capital andwhich provides that the institution is genuinely credible to survive and continue
its business.
How may counterparties react and respond to the new resolution regime? Clancy
advised that they should always deal on a collateralised basis. Moreover, the clearing of
repos and derivatives contracts may prevent certain issues, and counterparties may turn
to entities that are not subject to the BRRD or to only the biggest institutions in the relevant
market, rather than the smaller ones, because the big institutions may be seen as more
certain not to be subjected to the BRRD resolution regime.
Clancy concluded that because the resolution authorities nowhave the resolution tools
at their disposal, it seems that when an institution fails, it is the fault of the authorities.
However, the authorities cannot use the resolution tools until they conclude that the
institution is actually failing, which will be at a very late stage.
7 Discussion
After Clancy’s presentation, the chair opened the floor for discussion. In reaction to the
presentation of Bart Joosen, AartieHoeblal asked how exactly the link between the contin-
gent capital mechanisms in both the CRR and the BRRD will work out in practice. Bart
Joosen explained that theCRRprovisions about the contingent capitalmechanism continue
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to apply, even as the bail-in tool under the BRRD exists. Before the institution is failing or
likely to fail, the application of the CRR mechanisms can result in the replacement or
dilution of the regulatory capital providers. When the institution is subsequently moved
into resolution, the resolution authorities can apply the bail-in tool in respect of a wider
range of capital holders.
Rolef de Weijs asked whether the new resolution regime is only applicable when there
is a systemic risk. Patrick Clancy explained that the BRRD determines that the resolution
tools can only be used under certain circumstances and that certain objectives need to be
taken into account, such as the protection of depositors. When the collapse of a very small
credit institution is not likely to cause a systemic risk, the resolution authorities will not
be allowed to use the resolution tools. In such instance, the normal insolvency regime will
apply. Matthias Haentjens added that when a bad bank is created in the application of the
sale of business tool, the bridge bank tool or the asset separation tool, that bad bank has
to be wound up under normal insolvency law as well. According to Bart Joosen, it is,
however, not the case that the resolution regime of the BRRD will only be applicable to
large institutions because small institutions can also have important functions and can be
of systemic relevance.
Thomas van Rijn finally emphasised that the Single Resolution Mechanism is put in
the form of a regulation and that a patchwork of national laws addressing the resolution
of institutions, as mentioned by Bart Joosen, is therefore less likely to develop in the Euro
Area. Bart Joosen stated that Europe is, however, bigger than the Euro Area, and the
financial markets are certainly bigger than the Euro Area. The effect of the BRRD is,
therefore, still relevant.
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